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Abstract
Little investigation has been made to explain why women are less likely than are men to
support democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. This gender difference in politics has been found
in numerous studies and may hinder the much needed legitimation of democracy in this
region. This paper addresses the question of whether this observed gender gap is due to the
omission of social institutions related to gender inequality, something that affects women’s
daily life and deprives them of autonomy at home. We hypothesize that women who live
under autocracy at home are less likely to support democracy outside, because it does not
affect their private life; this follows the idea that the way women are treated in a society
might have major implications for the economic, social, and political functioning of that
society. We find that the gender difference in support for democracy is no longer significant
after we control for gender discrimination in the Family Code, in physical integrity or in civil
liberties. This study also provides evidence that women living in countries with favorable
laws toward women are more supportive of democracy than women who do not, suggesting
that democratic regimes may be more willing than are authoritarian regimes to protect laws
friendly to women.
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1 Introduction
An extensive macroeconomic literature has widely documented the major determinants of coun-
tries levels of democracy using cross-sectional data. At the micro level, recent work has focused
on the extent to which individuals in a society support democracy, in line with the political
view that has emphasized the importance of democratic legitimacy 1 on enhancing the level
of democracy in a country (Diamond (1999)). 2 What can explain the degree of support for
democracy in a country? Thanks to the growing number of available surveys, an influential
literature has studied the impact of numerous individual socio-economic characteristics on the
degree of endorsement and acceptance of democratic regimes. For instance, some scholars have
pointed out the impact of citizens’ level of education (e.g, Bratton et al. (2005), Evans and
Rose (2007b)) - based on the work of Lipset, which claims that education is a pre-condition for
democracy. Others have looked at the relation between religion and democracy (Rowley and
Smith (2009), Maseland and van Hoorn (2011)). This previous work controls for gender and
surprisingly finds a gender difference in support for democracy in developing countries, in par-
ticular in Sub-Saharan Africa, where women are less likely than men to assert that democracy
is the best political regime.
Yet this recurrent gender gap has received little attention in the literature and remains an
important research question that needs further investigation. As far as we know, an exception is
the analysis in Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014) where we have tried to test potential explana-
tions of this gap, focusing on both, differences in socio-economic characteristics between the two
genders and the institutional environment of the countries in which the women live. The main
result is that the socio-economic variables are less important than the institutional variables.
Indeed, an increase in the level of the Human Development Indicator and in political rights
moderates the magnitude of this gender difference in support for democracy, but controlling for
these institutional variables does not offset it. Overall, at this stage we are still left wondering
what explains this gender difference in support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite
the desirable features of democracy and the prominent role of women attitudes in promoting
development 3.
The present paper seeks to contribute to this literature and adds to the analysis the discrimi-
nation in social institutions that has been omitted in previous studies. Gender equality has many
distinct dimensions and also involves social institutions. 4 Social institutions are long-lasting
norms, traditions and codes-of conduct that find expression in traditions, customs and cultural
practices, informal and formal laws, and guide people behaviour and interaction (Branisa and
1The definition of legitimacy attitudes by Lipset (1963) is “Belief that the existing political institutions are
the most appropriate ones for the society ”(See Fails and Pierce (2010))
2Diamond (1999) argue that the stability of democratic systems requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy
by people. Besides, Mattes and Bratton (2007) report that “No matter how well or badly international aid donors
or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will only consolidate
if ordinary people believe that democracy is being supplied ”
3See the 2012 World Development Report, Ashraf et al. (2010), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Clots-
Figueras (2011) for some evidence on the role of women for development.
4Among the different dimensions of the gender equality we can not the economic participation, health and
well-being, political empowerment and education attainment
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Ziegler (2011)). An inequality in social institutions deprives women of autonomy and bargaining
power in the family and in the household, limits their access to different resources, which may
in turn generate additional external forms of inequality between the two genders.
Discriminatory social institutions that restrict women’s access to resources are detrimental
to welfare and are associated with bad economic and social features ( see for instance OECD
(2010) for the impact of social institutions on some of the Millennium Development Goals, and
OECD (2012) and Asian Development Bank (2013) for the investigation on food security). So
far, studies that have focused on the importance of social institutions on women’s behaviour in
politics have been scarcer, while women’s empowerment in politics has been a focal point when
discussing issues related to gender equality.
Yet, this paper fills this gap and attempts to emphasize the extent to which social institutions
are related to gender and democracy, and tests whether this observed difference in support for
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is due to the weak quality of social institutions related to
gender inequality, something which affects women’s daily life and deprives them of autonomy at
home. Our main hypothesis is that women who live under autocracy at home are less likely to
support democracy outside, because it does not affect their private life. This assumption follows
the idea that the way women are treated in a society might have major implications for the
economic, social, and political functioning of the society (Branisa et al. (2013)). Indeed, the
overall findings of this paper claim that the gender discrimination in social institutions that has
been previously blamed for slowing down some strategies of development in poverty reduction,
schooling and food security may also inhibit women’s attitudes in politics, hindering the much
needed democratic legitimacy in their own countries.
The analysis is conducted using the Afrobarometer data, a series of national surveys on the
attitudes of citizens towards democracy, markets, civil society and other aspects of development
in Sub-Saharan African countries. We start using the most recent Afrobarometer data, round
4, before moving to a larger sample where we add rounds 2 and 3 in order to take into account
simultaneously the time effects and the country fixed-effects, something that has been ignored
in the related literature. Round 4 is a combination of surveys that took place in 20 countries
between March 2008 and June 2009. Rounds 2 and 3 include fewer countries, and the interviews
were between the years 2002 and 2003 5 for the former and between 2005 and 2006 for the latter.
To define support for democracy, we follow the previous literature (e.g, Evans and Rose
(2007b), Evans and Rose (2007a), Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014) among others) and create
a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for people who assert that democracy is the
best political regime and zero for all the alternative responses that are proposed in the surveys
(see section 3). To measure social institutions, we use the recent OECD Gender Institutions
and Development Database and the five sub-components of the OECD Social Institutions and
Gender Index (SIGI). These indicators inform us about gender discrimination in the Family
Code, gender discrimination in terms of Civil Liberties, Physical Integrity, access to different
forms of resources, and the degree of preference for boys in a society. An influential literature
5For Zimbabwe the interviews for the round 2 have been taken place in 2004
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has recently used this OECD data at the macro level in order to determine the importance of
social institutions for various economic and social outcomes (e.g, Branisa et al. (2013); Branisa
and Ziegler (2011); OECD(2010, 2012); Jutting et al. (2010)).
We estimate a multilevel logit model where the dependent variable is the probability of sup-
porting democracy conditional on numerous individual socio-economic and demographic charac-
teristics. Our main focus is the sign and the significance of the coefficient on the dummy female
which takes a value of one for women and 0 for men. We also control for citizens understanding
of the meaning of democracy and their involvement in politics as well as their participation in
public affairs. Individuals are nested within countries in order to take into account heterogeneity
at the country level, capturing the fact that individuals within countries are more likely to have
similar behaviour.
The results show that there is a significant gender difference in support for democracy in
the sample. This finding confirms the previous studies and it is robust to the use of alternative
measures of support for democracy, to the use of different Afrobarometer samples, and to the
inclusion of both time and country fixed-effects. Interestingly, this gap becomes no longer
significant after we control for particular social institutions such as gender discrimination in the
Family Code, in physical integrity and in civil liberties. We also find that women living in a
country with favourable laws toward women have a higher degree of support for democracy than
other women.This can be explained by the hypothesis that democratic regimes are more willing
to protect such laws, friendly to women, than are authoritarian.
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review
of literature related to this paper; Section 3 describes the data, starting with a description of
the Afrobarometer surveys before moving on to the measures of social institutions used in this
paper. Section 4 sets up the empirical model that will be estimated and then Section 5 presents
the results. Some concluding comments are provided in Section 6.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. First it contributes to the literature
addressing the determinants of support for democracy in developing countries using survey
data. Education is one of the standard candidates that have been shown to affect positively the
degree of support for democracy, and influential evidence can be found in Bratton et al. (2005),
Evans and Rose (2007b) and Evans and Rose (2007a) among others. These analyses have used
different frameworks but they can all be linked to the theory of Lipset that claims that education
is prerequisite for democracy. Bratton et al. (2005) have provided evidence that educated people
in Sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to support democratic regimes even though the authors
claim that “awareness of the meaning of democracy and knowledge of leaders ”remains more
important than formal schooling. Evans and Rose (2007b) go beyond and provide a more
accurate framework to address the impact of formal education on the support for democracy in
Malawi, decomposing the level of education into its different stages. They conclude that primary
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schooling, which is the level of education of the majority of educated people in Africa, is sufficient
for the endorsement of democracy and the rejection of non-democratic regimes in Malawi. Their
recent investigation on the relation between education and support for democracy in Evans and
Rose (2007a) considers a larger sample of African countries and their results still concord with
their previous conclusion.6 Recently, Mattes and Mughogho (2009) have also contributed to this
strand of the literature, focusing on both the direct and the indirect impacts of education on the
support for democracy through access to the media and political participation using the latest
Afrobarometer data similar to our small sample in this paper. 7 Additional work has been
devoted to alternative potential determinants of support for democracy such as religion and
the notion of “the democratic paradox of Islam ”8 which has been resulted from this evidence.
Using the World Value Surveys, Rowley and Smith (2009) find that predominantly Muslim
countries have a higher degree of support for democracy than other countries. In their seminal
work, Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) challenge this Islam’s paradox, arguing that the positive
attitudes of citizens in Muslim countries towards democracy are not limited to Muslim countries
and can be fairly explained by the theory of decreasing marginal utility, which suggests that
people more highly value scarcer goods.
In these papers, scholars have controlled for gender in their empirical models and have found
a significant gender difference in the support for democracy, with a sign indicating that women
are less supportive than men of democratic regimes. This recurrent gender gap has received
little attention in this literature. An exception is the analysis of the gender gap in democratic
attitudes in Sub-Saharan African countries by Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014), which showed
the importance of some institutions in quantifying the magnitude of this gap but failed to
determine what really explain such a gender difference in this region.
Second, closely related to the present paper is the research that has analyzed various aspects
of the gender difference in African political behaviour. For instance, Coffe and Bolzendahl
(2011) have focused on the gender gap in political participation. They show that individual
socio-economic characteristics that have been found to be important determinants of the gender
gap in political participation in Western countries (see Burns (2007)) are not very appropriate
for explaining the gender gap in political participation in African countries. Instead, they find
a strong correlation between a country’s level of formal institutions and the level of the gender
gap in political participation. These findings have been one of the focal points of the paper
by Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014), who have included countries institutional climate as one
of the potential explanations of the gender gap in the support for democracy in Sub-Saharan
6Furthermore, Evans and Rose (2007a) have figured-out mechanisms through which education affects support
for democracy and argue that “the mechanisms through which schooling influences democratic support relate to
cognitive elements of political comprehension and involvement that are consistent with an intrinsic model of the
effect of education on democratic values and outcomes rather than a view of education as a marker of resource
inequalities ”.
7See also Shafiq (2010) for further investigation of the impact of education on support for democracy in others
developing countries. Using the Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys Shafiq (2010) find that education has a
strong effect on support for democracy in Lebanon, Jordan and Pakistan.
8This paradox expressed by Rowley and Smith (2009) is the fact that democracy is popular, but rare in
Muslim-majority countries.
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African countries. Using the Afrobarometer data, round 4, they found that the levels of Human
Development Indicator and of political rights do not offset this gender gap: instead, they just
help quantify its magnitude.
Finally, Our paper also follows the influential literature that has focused on the negative
impact of the different forms of gender inequality and discrimination against women on various
economic outcomes such as education and employment (e.g, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004);
Klasen and Lamanna (2009)). Based on this finding, it is worth looking at the origin of this
gender discrimination. Thus, recently Branisa et al. (2013) have posited that gender inequalities
are rooted in gender roles that evolve from (often informal) institutions that shape everyday life
and form role models that people try to fulfill and satisfy. Indeed, considering social institutions
that affect individual’s daily lives and deprive women of autonomy in the home is of major
interest for development studies related to gender issues. Previously, a number of studies have
examined the relation between women’s autonomy and their fertility decisions at the household
level. For example, one can note the analysis by Hindin (2000) for a case study in Zimbabwe,
Gage (1995) for Togo, Balk (1994) for a case study in Bangladesh among others.
At the cross-country level, it has been more difficult to address the impact of social institu-
tions on economic outcomes due to the scarcity of data of this category of institutions. Recently,
Jutting et al. (2008) have presented the OECD data from the Gender, Institutions and Develop-
ment Data Base that complements the existing gender discrimination indexes. This is the first
data on gender inequality that takes into account different measures of social norms, traditions
and family laws. Branisa and Ziegler (2011) have used this data in order to re-examine the re-
lation between gender inequality and corruption and add in the measures of social institutions,
a variable that had been omitted in the previous literature. They have provided evidence that
the level of corruption in a country depends strongly on the extent to which social institutions
deprive women of the freedom to participate in social life.
In addition, the OECD Development Center (2010) has examined the relation between dis-
criminatory social institutions and some of the height Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
These studies have specifically concentrated on the eradication of extreme poverty (MDG 1), the
achievement of universal primary education (MDG 2) and the improvement of maternal health
(MGD 5). They show that more gender equality in decision-making power in the household
enables women to allocate efficiently the resources, which in turn will increase the welfare of
the family, reducing the intensity of poverty, hunger and malnutrition. They have also provided
evidence that an increase of women’ decision-making power in the household will expand fe-
males’ ability to ensure complete schooling for their children. They have further shown that
domestic violence against women and genital mutilation of women decrease women’s rights and
decision-making power, and this is detrimental to maternal health and fertility control.
In the same spirit, Branisa et al. (2013) have created the Social Institutions and Gender Re-
lated Index (hereafter SIGI) which is an aggregate measure of the different indicators presented
in Jutting et al. (2008). Using cross-country data, Branisa et al. (2013) have analysed the
effect of the SIGI on various development outcomes. They have found that social institutions
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lower female secondary education and increase fertility rates, child mortality and the level of
corruption. Indeed this study has shown the importance of considering social institutions in the
choice of policies intended to address gendered development outcomes. Using the SIGI index,
Jutting et al. (2010) have analysed the impact of gender discrimination in social institutions on
discrimination between men and women in the job market for 44 developing countries. Their
results highlight that social institutions are crucial for activity patterns and job quality for
women.
3 Data
3.1 The Afrobarometer surveys
To carry out our empirical analysis, we start with the most recent available data of the Afro-
barometer, round 4. For the purpose of robustness, we will combine round 4 with rounds 3
and 2 in order to include simultaneously the time and the country fixed-effects as well as any
variations in the indicators of social institutions over time. The Afrobarometer, round 4, is a
collection of surveys that took place in 20 African countries between March 2008 and June 2009.
In total 27,713 individuals between 18 and 64 years of age were interviewed in these follow-
ing countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is a face-to-face interview where the questions are in the
local language. The method of random selection is used at each stage of the sample in order to
provide a representative cross-sectional sample of all the citizens of voting age within countries.
9 Due to missing data for social institutions for Cape Verde, we prefer to exclude it from our
data for the rest of the analysis.
(a) Dependent variable: Support for democracy
The main dependent variable is the support for democracy. To build this variable, we use
question 30 of the survey, 10 which is: “Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?
”The possible choices are: (1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; (2) In
some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; (3) For someone like me,
it does not matter what kind of government we have and (4) I don’t know. Figure 1 presents
the repartition of respondents into the different possible answers. 69% of people answer (1),
the remaining 31% are divided into 11% for answer (2), 12% for (3) and 8% ’don’t know’. For
the purpose of this analysis, all the categories other than “Democracy is preferable to any other
kind of government ”are aggregated because it is not obvious how to order them in terms of
preference for a democratic regime (see also Evans and Rose (2007b) for this purpose). We code
the dummy democracy as equal to 1 if the response is (1), meaning that the individual supports
democracy and democracy equals 0 for any of the alternative responses.
9Further details on the data are available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-
principles
10It refers to the question number 37 for the round 3 and 38 for the round 2
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Furthermore, additional measures that can be seen as important issues when we define a
democratic regime will be also considered in the analysis to check the robustness of the results.
We particularly define a dummy election that informs us about the process through which
elections are set; a dummy plurality for the existence of multiple political parties; a dummy
media to capture support for democracy according to the freedom of the media; and finally a
dummy constitution related to the number of terms that should be allowed to the president.
Questions 31, 32, 35 and 38, respectively, help code these proxies for democracy. Hence we code
election as 1 for respondents who agree that the leader should be chosen through regular, open
and honest elections; plurality equals 1 for people who think that many political parties are
needed to make sure that citizens have real choices in who governs them; media equals 1 for
those who agree that the media should constantly investigate and report on corruption and the
mistakes made by the government, and finally the dummy constitution takes the value of 1 for
individuals who share the idea that we should limit the president to serving a maximum of two
terms in office.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the Afrobarometer variables used in this paper.
Overall in this data African citizens register a significant degree of support for democracy with
69% of them asserting that democracy is the best political regime; 79% agree that elections
should be regular, open and honest; 69% are in favour of the existence of multiple political
parties in their country; 75% support the freedom of the media; finally 73% of African people
agree that the number of terms for a leader should not exceed two.
(b) Explanatory variables
Our primary explanatory variable is female, which takes the value of 1 for a woman and 0 for
a man. The data have 50.07% women and 49.93% men. Table 2 presents the degree of support
for democracy by gender. The last column of this table informs us about the test of equality
between the proportion of men and the proportion of women who give similar responses for the
question 30 on individuals preference for democracy. We observe that the test of the equality of
the proportion of men and the proportion of women is rejected for the different categories except
for the category ”In some circumstances a non-democratic regime can be preferable”. The next
table, Table 3, shows similar results using the alternative proxies for support for democracy.
The choice of the additional explanatory variables is based on the existing theories as well as
on the previous literature in this field. As standard independent variables, we include education,
age, location, head of household, employment status, access to media, understanding of the
meaning of democracy, and variables to proxy people’s interest in politics and their experience
of corruption. Education is divided into five categories: no-formal schooling, which includes 20%
of the people, incomplete primary school (18%), completed primary (35%), secondary (15%), and
post-secondary, which has the lowest rate, including less than 11% of the sample. We expect that
education increases significantly the degree of support for democracy because educated people
are more likely to be interested in politics and are more able to understand the importance of
democracy. This is in line with the theory of Lipset that claims that education is prerequisite
for democracy.
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To look at whether the degree of support for democracy is associated with the people’s
experience, we group individuals into three different categories of age: those who are between 18
and 25 (27% of the sample), people between 26-35 (29%), and people older than 35 (43% of the
sample). For the place of residence we have distinguished between people living in rural areas
(63%) versus urban areas (36%). Employment status has three categories: inactive, accounting
for 31% of the sample and active, sorted into unemployed (34% ) and employed (33%). To
measure the access to media, we consider separately the access to news from radio, from TV,
and from newspapers. For each of them, the variable access to media is a dummy equal to 0 if
the individual attests never having had access to media from the given source, and 1 otherwise.
In the sample, almost 87% have access to news from radio, against 54% for TV. Indeed, access to
TV remains costly in developing countries, especially for people leaving in rural areas. Finally,
only 40.61% have access to news from newspapers, a number which is not surprising given the
fact that reading news papers requires some level of education, yet in this dataset 20% of the
people do not have formal schooling and 18% haven’t completed their primary degree.
One of the major disadvantages of the Afrobarometer data is the lack of information for
income at the individual level, a variable that may be crucial for people’s attitudes toward
democracy. The two possibilities that we have chosen for dealing with this issue are first, to try
to measure the level of poverty by using the questions of the survey that ask people how often
they (or their family) have gone without food, water, medicine or cash. Only 45% have never
gone without food, as against 52% for water, 41% for medicine and 22% for cash. Second we
will also include in the analysis the natural logarithm of the GDP/capita at the country level.
Another aspect that we will also consider in our analysis is people’s understanding and
involvement in public affairs and politics. To proxy an individual’s understanding of the meaning
of democracy, they are asked how democratic is their country and they have different possible
answers: “not a democracy ”, “a full democracy ”, “a democracy with minor or major problems
”, “do not understand the question ”or “do not understand what democracy is ”. With this
information, we will create four different categories: the control group is people who think that
their country is a full democracy, the second is for those who think that it is not a democracy,
the third category includes people who believe that their country is a democracy with minor or
major problems, and the last group includes all people who do not understand the meaning of
democracy. Finally, individuals are asked whether they have voted in the the last election and
whether they are interested in public and political affairs.
3.2 Measuring Social Institutions
Different indexes of gender inequality have been proposed in the literature. The most widely
used are the UND’s Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment measure
(GEM). The GDI is an unweighted measure of gender differences in income, life expectancy at
birth, and education. The GEM is a measure of the political and economic position of women and
is an average of the following dimensions: the share of women in parliament, the male/female
ratio among workers (administrators, managers, professional and technical workers), and the
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ratio of female/male GDP per capita. A key common issue with these measures of gender
inequality is that they rather indicate the gender discrimination in terms of outcome, but they
don’t really inform us about the discrimination related to social institutions that may affect
individuals’ daily life in their own home.
To measure social institutions, this paper uses the OECD Social Institutions and Gender In-
dex (SIGI) . This data provides a series of indexes on discriminatory social institutions for over
one hundred developed and developing countries. For the purpose of this paper, we will consider
the aggregate SIGI measure and its five components in order to characterize the types of inequal-
ity in social institutions that really matter for the endorsement and acceptance of democracy by
women. These five indicators of the SIGI are the degree of discrimination in the Family Code
(hereafter FC), the restricted physical integrity (PI), the son bias index (SON), the restricted
resources and entitlements index (resource), and the restricted civil liberties index(CL). These
data were first launched in 2009 and were recently updated in 2012.
• FC captures institutions that influence the decision making of women in the household
and gives information on whether women are discriminated in terms of minimum age of
marriage as well as in terms of parental authority (both during marriage and after divorce)
and in inheritance rights. This index also takes into account the intensity of women’s early
and forced marriages.
• The PI component informs us about violence against women and the existence of legal
protection for women from rape, domestic violence and genital mutilation. It also measures
the extent to which women are free to engage in family planning.
• CL measures the freedom of participation of women taking into account the restrictions of
women in moving alone and accessing public space without the agreement of their husband
or other male family member.
• The resource index measures the access of women to several types of property, such as
agricultural or non-agricultural lands, bank loans and any others form of credits.
• The component Son indicates the degree of missing women and the preference for boys in
a society.
The method of polychronic principal component analysis is applied for the computation of each
of these five aggregate indexes of social institutions related to gender discrimination. These
indexes take values between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the highest level gender discrimination
and 0 represents no discrimination. The aggregate SIGI index is obtained using the formula of
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke. 11 Table 4 shows countries’ levels of social institutions, while table 5
shows the descriptive statistics. We observe that for the recent data on social institutions
provided in 2012, Mali has the highest value for the discrimination in FC, PI and also in CL
along with Nigeria. Benin and Uganda record the worst value for the discrimination in access
11Further details on the SIGI index can be found in Branisa et al. (2009)
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to resources. In contrast, South Africa has the best position in terms of FC, PI and CL, while
Lesotho has a value of zero for access to resources. Liberia and Mozambique have the lowest
index of son preference.
4 Empirical strategy
We have data for J =1,2,...19 countries, and nj defines the number of observations per country
that varies across countries. The variable of interest is support for democracy denoted by
democracy. For each individual in the sample we attribute a value of 1 or 0 as follow:
democracyij =
1 if the individual i living in country j supports democracy,0 otherwise (1)
Given the structure of the variable of interest which is a dichotomous we estimate a varying-
intercept multilevel (or hierarchical) logit model where individuals are nested within countries.
Hence, we will consider a two-level model where the highest level is the country and the lowest
level is the respondent. We follow the same specification than in the previous studies, in par-
ticular the one in Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014). Let us denote piij the probability that the
individual i living in country j supports democracy. This probability is given as follow:
piij = Prob(democracyij = 1, ωij) (2)
More explicitly we can express this probability as:
piij =
1
1 + exp(−ωij) (3)
where,
ωij = β0 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + ij (4)
Our parameter of interest is β1 which tells us about the impact of gender on the probability to
support democracy. A negative sign means that being female decreases the probability to support
democracy compared to male. The vector Xij contains the socio-economic characteristics of
individual i in country j. Individuals who live in the same country may not be independent thus
standard errors may be underestimated with the traditional regression techniques. Multilevel
modeling has the advantage to take into account such a clustering effect. By allowing the
intercept to vary across countries we have then:
Level 1: ωij = β0j + β1femaleij + β2Xij + ij, εij ∼ N(0, σ2),
Level 2: β0j = β00 + uj, uj ∼ N(0, δ2), εij⊥uj
(5)
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Thus the general model can be written as follow:
ωij = β00 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + uj + ij (6)
The term uj+ij in equation 7 represents the random part of the model where uj is the country-
specific effect and ij is the individual-level error term.
The main focus in this paper is to test whether the gender gap in support for democracy is
explained by the low quality of social institutions related to gender inequality that affect women
daily life and deprive them from autonomy at home. To test this hypothesis we include both
countries aggregate measures of social institutions as well as the term of interaction between so-
cial institutions and gender to control for the indirect impact of being female on the probability
to support democracy through social institutions. In fact the inclusion of this term of interac-
tion between gender and social institutions will allow us to compare the degree of support for
democracy between women living in different countries with different level of social institutions.
Following is the general model including social institutions:
ωij = β00 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + β3SIj + β4femaleij ∗ SIj + uj + ij (7)
where, SIj is the indicator of social institutions in country j. The estimated value of β4 tells us
whether female’s support for democracy depends on the environment in which they live that is
determined by the quality of the social institutions in the domestic country.
To measure the correlation between individuals that share the same country we use a measure
of intraclass correlation, which indicates the proportion of the variance that is explained by the
clustering structure. The formula for the interclass correlation ρ is given by:
ρ =
δ2
δ2 + σ2
The parameter δ2 is the variance of the error term uj , and by convention in a multilevel logit
model the parameter σ2 is fixed and is given by :
pi2
3 ≈ 3.29 (see Hox (2010)) where pi is the
mathematical constant approximately equals to 3.14.
5 Results
5.1 Support for Democracy
Table 6 presents the results of the estimations of the multilevel logit model without controlling
for social institutions. The dependent variable is the probability of asserting that democracy
is the best political regime. The intra-class correlation is equal to 0.146 meaning that more
than 14% of the variance is explained by the country characteristics. This confirms that taking
into account the clustering effect may improve the quality of the estimations of the standard
errors. We now start with column [1] where the dummy female is the only covariate and later on
the next rows we substantially control for additional individual socio-economic characteristics.
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Across these columns we can see that the coefficient on female is negative and significant at the
conventional level of 1%, meaning that being female decreases significantly the probability of
asserting that democracy is the best political regime. Indeed, the coefficient on female decreases
across columns when we control for additional variables, but it still remains significant at the 1%
level. This table provides evidence that in our data there is a gender difference in the support
for democracy, and this confirms the previous results in the literature.
Turning now to the other individual characteristics included in the regression, we find that
education increases the probability of supporting democracy and this effect increases with the
level of education. The variable age is an important determinant of support for democracy and
we find that young people support democracy less than their elders. Little attention has been
given to explaining the behaviour of Africa’s youth in politics, but some evidence can be found
Resnick and Casale (2011), who find that youth in Sub-Saharan Africa has a lower incentive to
vote compare to the rest of the population and are also less partisan that their elders. Urban
residents are more supportive of democracy than those from rural areas, but this effect becomes
insignificant once we control for employment status and access to different sources of media.
We do not find a significant difference between employed and inactive individuals, but being
unemployed decreases the probability of supporting democracy. The results also show that
people who are getting news from the radio are more democratic than people who do not have
access to media from any source. However, access to media from newspapers is not a robust
determinant of support for democracy and TV remains insignificant.
We have investigated the impact of people’s understanding of democracy, and column [4]
shows that people who know the meaning of democracy are more likely than others to support
democracy. Also, the participation in political and public activities is an important determinant
of an individual’s preference for democracy. For instance, people who haven’t voted in the last
election are less likely to support democracy than people who have voted. Besides, individuals
who are not interested in public affairs are less likely than others to assert that democracy
is the best political regime. In addition, individuals who have experienced corruption favour
democracy less than those who have never experienced corruption. This is in line with the
existing literature, which has noted the negative correlation between corruption and democracy.
Table 7 presents additional estimations using alternative proxies for support for democracy.
We first consider the fact that women may be likely to answer less extremely or go for ’don’t
know’ in general. Thus, we create two new dummies, dem1 and dem2: the former excludes
people who reply either ’for someone like me it does not matter what type of government we
have’ or ’I don’t know’. The latter measure of democracy, dem2, excludes only individuals
who give the response ’I don’t know’. Results using dem1 and dem2 are presented in columns
[1] and [2] and highlight that the coefficient on female remains negative and significant at the
1% conventional level, even though the magnitude of the coefficients on gender becomes lower
than in Table 6. Furthermore, we use alternative proxies for support for democracy: election,
plurality, freedom of the media and constraint on the constitution. We find that there is a gender
difference in support for democracy but this difference disappears once we use election as proxy
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for support for democracy. We have shown in this section that there is a gender difference in
support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa that is robust to the use of alternative measures
for support for democracy. This result is again a confirmation of the findings in the previous
literature (e.g, Evans and Rose (2007b), Garcia-Penalosa and Konte (2014) among others). Yet,
little attention has been paid to explaining this gap and we are still left wondering what explains
this gender difference in support for democracy in this region where democracy is a relatively
new concept. The next section tries to give a plausible answer by considering the role of gender
discrimination in social institutions.
5.2 Support for Democracy and Social Institutions related to gender dis-
crimination
This section investigates the role of social institutions in the degree of support for democracy
in Sub-Saharan Africa, testing whether this observed gender difference can be explained by
the low quality of the social institutions related to the gender inequality that affects women’s
daily life and deprives them of autonomy at home. We hypothesize that women who live under
autocracy at home are less likely to support democracy outside, because it does not affect their
private life; this follows the idea that the way women are treated in a society might have major
implications for the economic, social, and political functioning of that society. To measure the
discrimination is social institutions we use the 2012 OECD Gender Institutions and Development
Database which provides series of consistent indexes on discrimination against women for several
countries.
We now add these different measures of social institutions and their interaction terms with
female to our baseline model in order to take into account both the direct and the indirect
impacts of social institutions on the degree of support for democracy. The results are presented
in Table 8, and show that controlling for some of the social institutions related to gender dis-
crimination offsets the gender difference in support for democracy. The first column of Table 8
reports the results where we have controlled for the index of the Family Code. The direct im-
pact of female on the probability of supporting democracy becomes insignificant. Turning to the
coefficients on FC, we find that for men, discrimination in the family code does not affect their
degree of support for democracy, but such discrimination has a negative impact on the degree of
support for democracy by women. Indeed, in countries with a high degree of discrimination in
the Family Code women exhibit a lower degree of support for democracy than do women who
live in countries with less discrimination.
The results are similar when we replace the discrimination in the Family Code by discrimi-
nation in physical integrity as in the column [2]. In column [3], social institutions are measured
using gender discrimination in civil liberties, and the results show that the gender gap in support
for democracy becomes insignificant but the interaction between female and CL is significant
only at 10%. Column [4] shows the estimates of the baseline model when we have controlled for
the index of inequality in access to resources (hereafter resource), which measures the degree of
restriction of access by women to different types of resources . We do not find that the gender
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difference disappears once we control for the discrimination in access to resources, a variable that
has been crucial in other studies that have focused on economic outcomes using cross-sectional
data. In addition, the discrimination in access to resources increases the degree of support for
democracy by men but it does not have any impact on the degree of support for democracy by
women. Finally the last column of the table shows the results using the sub-index son bias,
which measures the extent to which boys are preferred to girls as well as the number of missing
women. We find that the coefficient on female becomes insignificant but neither the coefficient
on son nor the interaction term with female remain significant.
This section has evidenced clearly the role of social institutions related to gender inequality
in the gender difference in preference for democratic regimes in 19 Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. The results have confirmed our main hypothesis, which posited that the gender difference
in the support for democracy can be explained by the gender discrimination that affects women
within their own family, asserting that women who live under autocracy at home are less likely
to support democracy outside, because it does not affect their private life. Indeed, Table 8 has
shown that after controlling for FC, PI and CL, the gender difference in support for democracy
becomes insignificant, and furthermore women who live in countries with a high level of dis-
crimination are less likely to support democracy than women who live in countries with more
equitable social institutions. This last point implies that gender attitudes and preferences in
politics can be determined by the bias of laws toward women. Indeed, women living in a country
with equitable laws toward women are more supportive of democracy since democratic regime
can enforce these laws better than an authoritarian regime.
5.3 Large sample: Time effects
The previous sections have dealt with the gender difference in democratic attitudes using the
Afrobarometer, round 4, which is the more recent data and also has the advantage of covering
more countries than the previous Afrobarometer surveys. In this section, we propose to combine
round 4 with the rounds 3 and 2 in order to take into any time and country fixed-effects, but
we will then have an unbalanced sample since some countries are missing in rounds 2 and 3.
Round 3 contains only 18 countries since it excludes Burkina Faso and Liberia, while round 2
includes neither these two countries nor Benin or Madagascar. In the combined data, 65.7%
of the population support democracy against 34.26% who do not. Across genders, we observe
that 61.2% of women have chosen democracy as the best political regime against 70.3% for
men, yielding a gender gap of 9 points , one point higher than the value recorded when we only
considered round 4. 12
We now move to the Table 9, where we use the large sample to test whether the gender
difference in support for democracy holds in this data. Let us mention that due to missing
information on individual attitudes during the last elections in round 2, we have not controlled
for the variable vote for the rest of the analysis. Across the different specifications, the coefficients
on female remain negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on female are very
12For the round 3 the gender gap is equal to 12.84 points and decreases to 7.4 for the round 2.
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close to the ones reported in columns [4] and [5] of Table 6. When we focus on the other
explanatory variables included in the estimations, one can note that there are no important
changes between Table 9 and Table 6. The results are robust across columns and are not
sensitive to the inclusion of either time fixed-effects, country fixed-effects, or GDP/capita.
To shed light on the role of social institutions in the explanations of this significant gender
difference, we will use the two unique datasets on inequality in social institutions provided by
the OECD Development Centre. The first dataset was presented in 2009 and the second one
was launched recently in 2012 and it improves significantly the quality of the previous data in
2009. To collect the information on the SIGI sub-indicators for 2012, the OECD Development
Center has taken, for each country, the most recent available information up to 2011 and most
of the information is between the years 2003 and 2005. Since we believe that the level of gender
discrimination embedded in social institutions may explain people’s attitudes and their support
for democracy, the measures of social institutions that we consider should be available before
or at the starting date of the surveys. Given that, we propose to combine the data in 2009 and
in 2012 following three different strategies. First, we simply use the values of 2012 for all three
rounds. However, in this manner, we might be ignoring the variation in social institutions over
time even though we expect that these types of institutions are persistent and do not vary a lot
over time. In the second strategy, we propose to use the measure of 2012 for rounds 4 and 3,
and the value in 2009 for round 2. Finally, the last strategy is to use data in 2012 for round 4
and the data in 2009 for rounds 3 and 2. We then denote the first possibility by SI, SI1 denotes
the second, and SI2 for the last one, where SI stands for ’social institutions’.
The next table, Table 10 presents the results where we add substantially the measures of
social institutions, particularly those that were previously significant: inequality in the Family
Code, physical integrity and civil liberties. In the different specifications, we have controlled
for both time fixed-effects and country fixed-effects. We find that across the rows (1)-(6), after
controlling for the different measures of Family Code and Physical Integrity, the coefficients
on female become insignificant. However, the interaction terms between female and social
institutions are significant in all of these columns, supporting the previous conclusion where we
argued that women living in countries with high level of discrimination in social institutions are
less likely to support democracy than are other women. These various results fit well with the
earlier results we got with the smaller sample, where we ignored any possible time variation.
However, in the last three columns, where we controlled for the indicators of social institutions
related to inequality in civil liberties, we find that the coefficient on gender remains negative
and significant at the conventional level of 1%.
In this section, we have combined the three rounds of the Afrobarometer to be able to capture
the time dimension. The results have shown that the gender difference in support for democracy
hold in this larger sample and becomes insignificant once we control for discrimination in the
Family Code and in Physical Integrity.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Despite the many desirable features of democracy and the prominent role of women’s attitudes
in promoting development, a wide range of studies have recently highlighted that women are
less likely than men to support democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. This observed difference
raises the question of whether women’s behaviour may hinder the much needed legitimacy of
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which democracy is a relatively a new concept.
Yet, little effort has been made to address this issue, and at this stage we are still left wondering
what really explain this difference between the genders.
This paper re-examines the link between the support for democracy and gender, and adds a
new, previously omitted variable: social institutions, which captures the extent to which women
are discriminated against in a society. Social institutions related to gender inequality are long-
lasting norms, traditions, and codes of conduct that deprive women of autonomy and bargaining
power at home and limit their access to different types of resources. An influential literature
has documented the importance of social institutions on several development strategies but so
far, studies that have focused on the importance of these institutions for women’s behaviour
in politics have been scarcer, while women’s political empowerment is of great interest when
addressing gender equality.
This paper tries to incorporate gender discrimination in social institutions into this frame-
work and tests the hypothesis that women who live under autocracy at home are less likely
to support democracy outside, because it does not affect their private life, following the idea
that the way women are treated in a society might have major implications for the economic,
social, and political functioning of that society. Our analysis is conducted using 3 rounds of the
Afrobarometer data, a series of national surveys on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy,
markets, civil society and other aspects of development in a number of Sub-Saharan African
countries. To measure social institutions we use the recent OECD data on Social Institutions
and Gender Index (SIGI) and its five sub-components: Family Code, Civil Liberties, Physical
Integrity, Son Preference and Restrictions on the Access to different forms of resources.
The results show that there is a significant gender difference in the support for democracy
in the sample, but this gap is no longer significant after we control for gender discrimination in
the Family Code, in Physical Integrity and in Civil Liberties. The results are robust to the use
of different Afrobarometer surveys and to the inclusion of time and country fixed-effects. This
study has also provided evidence that policies that are intended to fight against females’ early
and forced marriages, to make effective laws against different types of violence against women,
and to promote their freedom of movement and access to public space have the potential of
increasing the degree of support by women for democracy. This can be explained by the fact
that democratic regimes may be more willing to enforce than authoritarian regimes such gender-
equitable laws.
These findings support the proposition that social institutions are causes of the gender gap in
the political arena, reducing the level of democratic legitimacy in Sub-Saharan African countries,
which may in turn hamper the supplied amount of democracy in these countries. This paper is
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an additional confirmation of the importance of promoting policies that will have the potential
to improve the quality of social institutions. Indeed fighting against discrimination in social
institutions remains difficult because it requires some cultural changes which is a matter of
individual beliefs in cultural codes and norms.
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Table 1: Afrobarometer: Descriptive statistics
Variable Question Nb Percentage
Support for democracy q30 Yes 18285 69.15
No* 8159 30.85
Free elections q31 Yes 20324 79.05
No* 5386 20.95
Multiple parties q32 Yes 17435 69.4
No* 7689 30.6
Freedom of media q35 Yes 18792 75.81
No* 5996 24.19
Limited turns for presidents q38 Yes 18137 73.71
No* 6468 26.29
Female q101 Male* 13207 49.93
Female 13242 50.07
Education q89 No Formal* 5454 20.65
Some Primary 4780 18.1
Primary 9348 35.4
Secondary 4033 15.27
Post-secondary 2793 10.58
Age q101 <26* 7176 27.48
<36 7734 29.61
>35 11206 42.91
Location URBRUR Urban 9761 36.9
Rural* 16688 63.1
Head of the Household q2 Yes* 13646 52.01
No 12590 47.99
Employment status q94 Inactive 8386 31.82
Unemployed* 9042 34.19
Employed 8930 33.88
* indicates the reference group in the estimations.
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Table 1 (Continued): Afrobarometer: Descriptive statistics
Variable Question Nb Percentage
Access to media via radio q12a Yes 22878 86.7
No* 3539 13.4
Access to media via TV q12b Yes 13931 52.8
No* 12451 47.2
Access to media via paper q12c Yes 10583 40.2
No* 15744 59.8
Gone without food q8a No* 12305 44.5
Yes 15346 55.5
Gone without water q8b No* 14324 51.77
Yes 13345 48.23
Gone without medicine q8c No* 11299 41.01
Yes 16254 58.99
Gone without cash q8d No* 6017 21.84
Yes 21534 78.16
Corrupted q51 No* 20510 78.43%
Yes* 5641 21.57
Extent of democracy q42a Full democracy* 7310 26.38
Not a democracy 1875 6.77
Don’t understand democracy 1202 4.34
Don’t know 1724 6.22
Vote during last elections q23d Has voted* 18503 69.96
No (for personal reasons) 1552 5.9
No(others reasons) 6214 23.62
Interested in public affairs q13 No* 4674 17.67
not very or somewhat 12468 47.59
Yes 9051 34.22
* indicates the reference group in the estimations.
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Table 2: Support for democracy by gender
Male Female Gender Gap
Democracy is preferable 73.58% 65.64% 7.94(0.0055)***
Sometimes a non democratic regime can be preferable 10.78% 11.39% 0.61(0.0038)
For some like me it does not matter 10.32% 12.76% 2.44(0.0038)***
I don’t know 5.31% 10.21% 4.9(0.00038)***
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level.
Table 3: Support for democracy by gender using alternatives measures
Male Female Gender Gap
Election 79.94% 78.91% 1.03(0.00497)**
Plurality 72.19% 64.47% 7.72(0.00575)***
Media 78.18% 73.60% 4.58(0.00531)***
Constitution 75.66% 71.48% 4.18(0.00547)***
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ** significant at 1% level and *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Social Institutions related to Gender Inequality-2012
country SIGI FC PI SON RESOURCE CL
Benin 0.4567 0.534 0.512 0.401 1 0.758
Botswana - 0.375 0.229 - 0.507 0.760
Burkina Faso 0.369 0.706 0.917 0.382 0.507 0.324
Ghana 0.2622 0.429 0.378 0.479 0.689 0.529
Kenya 0.2487 0.383 0.551 0.519 0.649 0.319
Lesotho - 0.456 - 0.368 0 0.264
Liberia 0.344 0.551 0.823 0.423 0 0.749
Madagascar 0.168 0.544 0.210 0.452 0.179 0.513
Malawi 0.218 0.298 0.313 0.391 0.507 0.702
Mali 0.601 1 0.964 0.347 0.179 0.962
Mozambique 0.22 0.510 0.276 0.325 0.507 0.633
Namibia 0.1358 0.330 0.251 0.428 0.507 0.258
Nigeria 0.442 0.601 0.413 0.52 0.676 0.976
Senegal 0.2304 0.611 0.566 0.450 0.167 0.477
South Africa 0.104 0.022 0.172 0.439 0.507 0.193
Tanzania 0.252 0.726 0.513 0.393 0.507 0.241
Uganda 0.3836 0.523 0.639 0.419 1 0.245
Zambia 0.305 0.585 0.502 0.344 0.507 0.746
Zimbabwe - 0.575 - 0.456 0.339 0.719
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Social Institutions Gender Index- 2012
Variable Nb Country Mean Std Min Max
SIGI 16 0.296 0.131 0.104 0.601
FC 19 0.514 0.199 0.022
PI 17 0.484 0.244 0.172 0.964
CL 19 0.546 0.255 0.193 0.976
Resource 19 0.470 0.280 0 1
SON 18 0.419 0.056 0.325 0.52
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Table 6: Support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Female -0.409*** -0.289*** -0.301*** -0.198*** -0.198***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
No formal educ1 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.094* 0.097*
(0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053)
educ2 0.508*** 0.507*** 0.286*** 0.290***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051)
educ3 0.614*** 0.609*** 0.372*** 0.375***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064)
educ4 0.781*** 0.752*** 0.516*** 0.518***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072)
< 26 age2 0.098** 0.111*** 0.002 0.003
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
age3 0.300*** 0.305*** 0.142*** 0.144***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046)
rural Urban 0.047 0.043 0.049 0.049
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Yes head -0.042 -0.037 -0.018 -0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Unemployed Employed -0.017 0.0048 -0.018 -0.017
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Inactive -0.184*** -0.148** -0.173** -0.172**
(0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067)
No tv 0.061 0.056 0.051 0.050
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
No radio 0.288*** 0.278*** 0.121** 0.121**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
No paper 0.082** 0.075* -0.012 -0.011
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
To be Continued on the next page. The table reports the coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent
variable is the probability to support democracy using the round 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The data used is the Afrobarometer, round 4.
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Table 6 (continued): Support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No food -0.169*** -0.145*** -0.144***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
No water 0.018 0.012 0.012
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
No medicine -0.049 -0.042 -0.044
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
No cash -0.013 0.022 0.022
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
No corruption -0.161*** -0.227*** -0.229***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
Full democracy extent1 -0.547*** -0.546***
(0.065) (0.065)
extent2 -0.324*** -0.323***
(0.038) (0.039)
extent3 -2.199*** -2.196***
(0.062) (0.062)
No publicinterest1 0.232*** 0.232***
(0.042) (0.042)
publicinterest2 0.379*** 0.380***
(0.046) (0.046)
No vote 0.298*** 0.296***
(0.036) (0.036)
Constant 1.056*** 0.204 0.391** 0.748*** 1.271***
(0.132) (0.147) (0.152) (0.144) (0.120)
Fixed-effect NO NO NO NO YES
BIC 30912 29512 28738 26619 26706
Deviance 30881 29350 28526 26346 26251
Nb obs 26,444 25,654 25,112 24,817 24,817
Nb country 19 19 19 19 19
The table reports the coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is the probability to support
democracy using the round 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10%. The data used is the Afrobarometer, round 4.
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Table 7: Alternative indicators for democracy
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female -0.149*** -0.156*** -0.041 -0.175*** -0.205*** -0.137***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034)
No formal educ1 0.069 0.051 0.029 -0.019 0.145*** 0.239***
(0.075) (0.057) (0.059) (0.049) (0.055) (0.054)
educ2 0.247*** 0.188*** 0.027 0.106** 0.138*** 0.346***
(0.072) (0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052)
educ3 0.277*** 0.274*** 0.108 0.174*** 0.262*** 0.501***
(0.088) (0.067) (0.069) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065)
educ4 0.359*** 0.431*** 0.209*** 0.310*** 0.343*** 0.566***
(0.097) (0.076) (0.077) (0.067) (0.074) (0.074)
< 26 age2 -0.002 -0.010 0.064 -0.067* 0.058 0.072
(0.059) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
age3 0.117* 0.127*** 0.180*** -0.063 0.0433 0.0938**
(0.063) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
Rural Urban 0.026 0.020 0.043 0.046 0.129*** 0.207***
(0.049) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
Yes head 0.005 -0.036 0.083** 0.022 0.048 -0.036
(0.052) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.038) (0.03)
Unemployed Employed -0.009 -0.044 -0.121*** 0.025 0.047 -0.012
(0.048) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
Inactive -0.274*** -0.232*** -0.236*** -0.095 -0.028 -0.147**
(0.089) (0.069) (0.072) (0.063) (0.072) (0.069)
No tv 0.012 0.028 0.005 0.014 0.069 -0.028
(0.058) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
No radio -0.058 0.110** -0.042 0.042 0.004 0.065
(0.072) (0.051) (0.054) (0.046) (0.050) (0.049)
No paper -0.059 -0.044 0.034 0.059 -0.044 0.060
(0.057) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
To be Continued on the next page. The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is
the probability to support democracy using alternative measures. The dependent variable is dem1 in [1], dem2 in [2],
election in [3], plurality in [4], media in [5] and constitution in [6]. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The data used is the Afrobarometer, round 4.
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Table 7 (Continued): Alternative indicators for democracy
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No food -0.133*** -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.0457 0.0439 -0.148***
(0.051) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
No water -0.014 0.022 -0.105*** 0.044 -0.087** 0.085**
(0.049) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
No medecine -0.080 -0.038 0.024 -0.038 0.007 0.056
(0.052) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
No cash 0.051 0.012 -0.017 -0.045 0.101** 0.075*
(0.060) (0.046) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045)
No corruption -0.301*** -0.252*** -0.136*** -0.043 0.087** -0.031
(0.052) (0.040) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
Full democracy extent1 -0.649*** -0.576*** -0.332*** 0.0972 0.535*** 0.462***
(0.088) (0.068) (0.069) (0.064) (0.073) (0.071)
extent2 -0.351*** -0.366*** -0.0842** 0.113*** 0.347*** 0.390***
(0.053) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
extent3 -0.731*** -1.349*** 0.0700 -0.219*** -0.0262 -0.0477
(0.106) (0.071) (0.073) (0.059) (0.064) (0.063)
No publicinterest1 0.086 0.214*** 0.198*** 0.035 0.025 0.083*
(0.059) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
publicinterest2 0.249*** 0.371*** 0.245*** 0.080* 0.106** 0.090*
(0.065) (0.048) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048) (0.047)
No vote 0.246*** 0.328*** 0.177*** 0.130*** 0.164*** 0.0962***
(0.049) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant 2.177*** 1.411*** 1.199*** 0.592*** 0.972*** 0.530***
(0.163) (0.126) (0.123) (0.107) (0.123) (0.117)
Fixed-effect YES YES YES YES YES YES
LL -7592 -11922 -11729 -14344 -12445 -12413
BIC 15621 24286 23902 29132 25332 25269
Deviance 15185 23844 23458 28776 24890 24826
Nb obs 20,206 23,121 24,236 23,732 23,430 23,253
Nb country 19 19 19 19 19 19
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is the probability to support democracy
using alternative measures. The dependent variable is dem1 in [1], dem2 in [2], election in [3], plurality in [4], media in [5]
and constitution in [6]. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at
10%. The data used is the Afrobarometer, round 4.
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Table 8: Gender Difference in Support for Democracy and Social Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male Female -0.106 -0.047 -0.058 -0.099 -0.251*** -0.003 0.047 -0.001 -0.193
(0.079) (0.075) (0.071) (0.067) (0.062) (0.245) (0.266) (0.303) (0.223)
Social Institutions
SIGI 1.744**
(0.795)
SIGI*Female -0.355
(0.245)
FC 0.464 0.600
(0.590) (0.604)
FC*Female -0.313** -0.334**
(0.140) (0.151)
PI 0.693 0.748
(0.451) (0.491)
PI*Female -0.317** -0.330**
(0.134) (0.152)
CL 0.825* 0.851**
(0.434) (0.428)
CL*Female -0.190* -0.187*
(0.113) (0.113)
RES 0.844**
(0.369)
RES*Female 0.111
(0.111)
SON 1.499
(2.134)
SON*Female -0.471
(0.573)
Ln(GDP) 0.075 0.026 0.059
(0.092) (0.094) (0.084)
Ln(GDP)*Female -0.008 -0.005 0.009
(0.022) (0.025) (0.021)
Constant 0.269 0.520 0.505* 0.304 0.350 0.072 -0.299 0.218 -0.306
(0.273) (0.335) (0.259) (0.274) (0.218) (0.904) (1.060) (1.069) (0.898)
Nb obs 21,355 24,817 22,524 24,817 24,817 23,648 24,817 22,524 24,817
Nb pays 16 19 17 19 19 18 19 17 19
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is the probability to support democracy.
All the additional explanatory variables that are in table 6 below are included in the estimations but are not reported.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The data used is the
Afrobarometer round 4.
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Table 9: Large Sample: Support for democracy
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
No formal educ1 0.082** 0.077** 0.084*** 0.079**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
educ2 0.273*** 0.265*** 0.275*** 0.267***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
educ3 0.361*** 0.349*** 0.363*** 0.351***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
educ4 0.522*** 0.506*** 0.524*** 0.508***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
< 26 age2 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.089***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
age3 0.244*** 0.237*** 0.245*** 0.238***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Rural Urban -0.034 -0.031 -0.034 -0.032
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Yes head 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Unemployed Employed -0.0419* -0.0759*** -0.0417* -0.076***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Inactive -0.074 -0.198*** -0.074 -0.198***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
No tv 0.094*** 0.081*** 0.094*** 0.081***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
No radio 0.136*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.150***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
No paper -0.019 0.002 -0.019 0.002
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
To be continued on the next page. The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is
the probability to support democracy. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,
* significant at 10%. The data used is the combination Afrobarometer rounds 4, 3 and 2.
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Table 9 (Continued): Large Sample: Support for democracy
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
food -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.134*** -0.138***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No water 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
No medecine -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.017
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
No cash 0.060** 0.056** 0.059** 0.056**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
No corruption -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.223*** -0.222***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Full democracy extent1 -0.879*** -0.866*** -0.879*** -0.867**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
extent2 -0.384*** -0.370*** -0.385*** -0.370***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
extent3 -3.142*** -3.114*** -3.143*** -3.114***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
No publicinterest1 0.299*** 0.314*** 0.299*** 0.315***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
publicinterest2 0.420*** 0.391*** 0.421*** 0.391***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
Constant 0.812*** 0.717*** 1.379*** 1.266***
(0.117) (0.118) (0.079) (0.081)
Time fixed-effects NO YES NO YES
Country fixed-effects NO NO YES YES
Nb obs 67,448 67,448 67,448 67,448
Nb country 19 19 19 19
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is the probability to support democracy.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The data used is the
combination Afrobarometer rounds 4, 3 and 2.
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Table 10: Large sample: Support for Democracy and Social Institutions
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male Female -0.160 -0.166 -0.147 -0.113 -0.177 -0.200 -0.407*** -0.425*** -0.463***
(0.167) (0.169) (0.172) (0.186) (0.184) (0.183) (0.142) (0.138) (0.137)
ln(GDP) 0.008 -0.007 -0.025 0.114** 0.145** -0.059 -0.031 -0.044 -0.0031
(0.048) (0.060) (0.058) (0.053) (0.069) (0.064) (0.057) (0.058) (0.047)
ln(GDP)*Fem 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.030** 0.032** 0.028**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
FC 0.65
(0.529)
FC*Fem -0.277***
(0.089)
FC1 0.059
(0.128)
FC1*Fem -0.294***
(0.100)
FC2 0.233*
(0.126)
FC2*Fem -0.342***
(0.116)
PI 1.127***
(0.431)
PI*Fem -0.401***
(0.097)
PI1 0.180
(0.166)
PI1*Fem -0.350***
(0.098)
PI2 0.207
(0.157)
PI2*Fem -0.345***
(0.101)
CL 0.536
(0.405)
CL*Fem -0.083
(0.066)
CL1 0.121
(0.075)
CL1*Fem -0.127**
(0.063)
CL2 0.235***
(0.075)
CL2*Fem -0.059
(0.06)
Constant 0.324 1.320** 1.386*** 0.324 -0.021 1.680*** 0.468 1.513*** 1.626***
(0.584) (0.528) (0.520) (0.609) (0.648) (0.590) (0.531) (0.517) (0.518)
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nb obs 67,448 67,448 67,448 60,846 61,903 62,912 67,448 67,448 67,448
Nb country 19 19 19 17 18 18 19 19 19
The table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is the probability to support democracy. Standard errors are
in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The data used is the combination Afrobarometer rounds 4, 3
and 2.
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